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Perceptions  of  money  do  influence  monetary  policy,  and  monetary  policy  does  have  an 
impact on the functioning of the economy.  For instance, a high interest rate policy usually 
entails high levels of bankruptcies and unemployment.  Also, given a loss of confidence in the 
issuing authority (monetary dislocation), paper money can and does fail in all its functions as 
a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of nominal value.  In a money economy 
in  which  nominal  money  is  the  medium  of  exchange,  nominal  money  prices  reflect  the 
underlying exchange ratios of the various commodities that are produced and exchanged for 
nominal  money.    In  the  absence  of  monetary  dislocation  (monetary  revaluation  or 
devaluation),  any  change  in  the  nominal  price  of  a  commodity  reflects  a  change  in  its 
purchasing power (a change in its exchange ratio vis-a-vis other commodities).  Monetary 
policy  prescriptions,  which  ignore  this  reality,  result  in  significant  displacement  costs  to 
members  of  society.    A  ‘pure  science’  approach  to  economic  research  engenders  policy 
prescriptions based upon assumptions of the economic system which are not aligned with the 
empirical  reality.    Hence,  to  avoid  severe  social  costs,  the  ‘pure  science’  approach  to 
economics needs to be modified to deal with social reality.    
_______________ 





This paper focuses on the 'pure science' approach to economic theorizing, whereby the 
inherent  or  underlying  assumptions  of  the  mathematical  models  employed  dominate  or 
displace  empirical  reality.    While  the  discipline  of  economics  has  benefited  immensely 
(gained new insights) from experimentation and model building due to the 'pure science' 
approach, policy recommendations and performance measurements, in particular monetary 
policy decisions, have been adversely influenced by that approach.  The concerns presented 
herein are shared by Blaug [1992], Mayer [1993], and O'Donnell [1992].  Blaug stresses the 
need for economic theorists to accept the fact that: (1) "...economic theories must sooner or 
later be confronted with empirical evidence as the final arbiter of truth ..." [1992,xii]; and (2) 
"if economists are going to take a stand on questions of economic policy, not to mention 
advising governments what to do, they must have knowledge of how the economic system 
functions..." [1992,xxii].  Mayer [1993] is concerned with the inordinate amount of effort 
expended in 'pure science' type of research.  O'Donnell  [1992] focuses on the consequences 
of policy decisions based on advice given to policymakers by 'pure science' economists.  In  
 
this  scenario,  "[t]he  core  concepts  of  economic  theory  are  frequently  presented  as  mere 
definitional postulates of the theory, rather than assertions about the nature of economic 
reality, and their arbitrary nature is defended as irrelevant given their role as assumptions.  
These definitional postulates or assumptions form the basis of logical-mathematical relations 
which . . . generate observation-statements" [O'Donnell 1992,78]. 
This paper is a discourse limited to the manner in which the monetarists’ model (which 
is a specific example of the ‘pure science’ approach) affects applied policy decisions.  Given 
the premises of monetarism, the policy implication is the acceptance of unemployment and 
bankruptcies as necessary costs for the maintenance of a certain level of prices [Fuhrer and 
Moore 1995].  While the implemented policy can hardly be expected to solve the problem, it 
can possibly exacerbate an aggravated situation.  Hence, monetary policy based upon the 
flawed quantity theory of money can disrupt the functioning of the economic system.  This 
issue is of utmost importance to all members of society and is of special significance to those 
whose employment opportunities can and are often affected by prescribed policy. 
The experienced contraction or expansion of economic activities in most developed 
economies  is  a  function  of  consumption  and  production  decisions  which  are  heavily 
influenced by prescribed monetary policy (i.e., an administered interest rate policy).  For 
economic  policy  to  be  effective,  economic  policy  prescription  must  be  related  to  the 
empirical reality; in which case, reference has to be made to the actions of individuals and 
organizations  and  the  consequences  of  those  actions.    As  noted  by  Rogerson  [1997,86]: 
“There is apparently a great deal of confusion between getting more precise specifications of 
one  particular  ad  hoc  rule  for  monetary  policy  and  getting  better  understanding  of  what 
constitutes  good  monetary  policy.    I  do  not  see  how  the  issue  of  understanding  what 
constitutes  good  monetary  policy  is  related  to  getting  smaller  standard  errors  on  the 
estimated coefficients of a regression of changes in inflation on unemployment.” 
 
ECONOMICS AND EMPIRICAL REALITY 
 
Pythagoreans "are credited with having divorced mathematics from practical ends, that 
is,  with  having  transformed  it  from  a  practical  ends,  as  it  was  ...,  into  a  liberal  art."  
Essentially, Pythagorean mathematics "rest upon a curious view of number which warns us 
that their doctrine existed for its originators in a mental context" [Farrington 1969,30].  Later  
 
mathematicians have created a totally independent world [Farrington 1969,30] which has its 
place, but to scorn the practical side of mathematics is to deny the purpose of its first creation 
[Newsom 1964,117]. Similar to mathematics (geometry emerged for the purpose of surveying), 
economics emerged as an empirical science and not as a ‘pure science’.   Economics draws 
its substance from empirical observations, yet many economic policy decisions are based 
upon economic theorizing which treats economics as a ‘pure’ instead of an ‘empirical’ science. 
Just as mathematicians have divorced mathematics from its empirical beginning so have some 
economists divorced economics from its empirical beginnings.  The strict adherence to the 
formalism of mathematics is a clear indication that economics is treated as a ‘pure science’.  
Undeniably mathematics is a powerful analytic tool and there is a significant role for 
mathematics in economics.  However, it is inescapable that when mathematics is  viewed as 
formal logic, only relationships matter; there is no room for empirical reality.  The government 
in general depends upon economists for guidance on monetary and fiscal policies.  For a policy 
to  be  effective  it  has  to  be  grounded  in  economic  theory  that  explains  or  describes  the 
empirical reality.  Policy prescriptions for society derived from mathematical models that are 
devoid of empirical reality can be productive only by sheer coincidence; in many instances 




The purpose of economic analysis is to enable an understanding of the behavior of 
individuals in an exchange setting and the effect of business, government, and philanthropic 
decisions on the economy.  Information obtained from this analysis provides a basis for 
governmental policy prescription.  A good description or explanation of behavior and the 
existing conditions provides a sound basis for the prediction or projection of possible future 
states.  Given  the  description  or  explanation,  prediction  then  is  based  not  upon  past 
conditions but upon economic conditions and behavior which are expected to prevail in the 
future.  In this setting, epistemological relevance has dominance over mathematical elegance.   
Mathematicians  can  be  excused  for  engaging  in a purely formal exercise shunning 
empirical realities; however, since governmental policy is heavily influenced by economic 
analysis,  there  is  no  justification  for  the  exclusion  of  empirical  reality  from  economic 
analysis which is aimed at policy prescription.  However, though influenced by political  
 
forces, prior policy makers at the Federal Reserve, in their quest to trash inflation, may have 
been more influenced by mathematical elegance of models relating to M1 and M2 than by 
epistemological relevance.   
The trade-off accepted by the U.S. government, implicit in the directive by the U.S. 
Congress [1975,1194] to maintain the long-run growth of monetary and credit aggregates 
consistent with the economy's long-run potential to increase output, has been less inflation at 
the expense of more unemployment [Solomon 1982,191-193].  Consistent with the directive, 
the Federal Reserve had set out to control the growth rate of the money supply at around 
5.8% for the period 1975-1985; however, the actual growth for that period was 8% [Rasche 
and Johannes 1987,185-186].   
The Federal Reserve essentially targeted the federal funds interest rate during the entire 
1967-1997  period.    After  greatly  broadening  the  federal  funds  target  range  in  1979,  the 
Federal Reserve maintained a restrictive monetary policy for an extended period to combat 
entrenched  changes  in  the  general  level  of  prices  and  the  general  price  level  declined 
precipitously [Thomas 1999,142-143].  However, the mathematical model did not conform 
to the economic reality.   Owing to the erratic behavior of the velocity of M1, the US shifted 
away from M1 as an intermediate target in February 1984 to measures of performance of the 
domestic  economy  [Melton  and  Roley  1990,78].    Since  then,  the  Federal  Reserve  has 
abandoned the dominant role for monetary aggregates in monetary policy--a zero weight is 
assigned to monetary aggregates [Blinder 1998,29].   
Since  output  failed  to  recover  from  the  recession  during  1990-1991,  the  Federal 
Reserve  dropped  its  federal  funds  target  [Thomas  1999,143].    The  current focus for the 
Federal  Reserve  is  on  business  expansion,  inflationary  pressures,  and  developments  in 
foreign-exchange markets [Melton and Roley 1990,67].  Furthermore, in recent years, there 
is much concern as to what weight should be placed on asset prices in wake of the booming 
activities in the financial markets [Greenspan 1999].  
 
THE PURE SCIENCE APPROACH 
 
In geometry, Euclid made a distinction between "axioms" and "postulates," but modern 
mathematicians consider these two terms synonymous and use either term to designate all the 
assumed propositions of a logical discourse [Eves and Newsom 1965,94].  Likewise, the  
 
followers of a 'pure science' of economics are not concerned with what is: self-evident (axiom), 
provable to be true (postulate), and a formal condition (assumption) of a system.  By treating 
all of these as the same, the system is formalized whereby empirical reality has no role. 
The economic system has a tendency toward equilibrium (equilibrium-seeking) but is 
in a continuous state of dynamic disequilibrium.  Under the 'pure science' approach, the 
assumptions  of  "general  equilibrium  of  markets"  and  "neutrality  of  money"  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  money  is  simply  superimposed  on  a  system  of  exchange  which  is  in 
equilibrium and the quantity of money in circulation buys the output of the system.  That is, 
the money in circulation exchanges regularly and repeatedly for the physical output in which 
case the money value of the output is distributed as money income which underwrites the 
purchases of the output.  This depiction of the quantity theory is to be found in Mill [1857 
(1929),493-494].  In this setting any increase in the money in circulation can only affect a 
change in the general price level.  Of necessity (another assumption), velocity is held constant.  
            In the monetarist literature, it is argued that the level of the nominal money supply is 
accountable for inflation.  To combat the effect of rising prices, an interest rate policy is 
prescribed (i.e., raising or lowering interest rates mainly through the discount rate and open 
market  operations  [FRBSF  01/01/1999]).    Implementation  of  this  policy  results  in  the 
contraction of the economy; and because of the ensuing unemployment with its consequent 
loss of purchasing power, prices tend to fall briefly.  The temporary fall in prices gives the 
impression that the interest rate approach to combating rising prices is working, but then 
prices  continues  to  rise.    The  continuous  rise  in  prices  is  due  to  the  credit  policies 
administered by businesses and bank lending practices.  Businesses extend the duration of 
payment  on  installment  purchases  and  financial  institutions  lengthen  the  time  for  loan 
repayment on consumer loans (e.g., see Consumer Bankers Association [1995]).  Hence, 
unemployment continues while prices continue to rise.  Additional doses of the interest rate 
medicine produce yet more instances of temporary price stabilization.
1  As described above 
[Thomas 1999], this stabilization effect of the interest rate policy is considered as evidence 
that the changes in level of the money supply is accountable for the changes in the general 
level of prices; hence, the quantity theory of money is valid.  The illusion continues.  
Mathematical elegance as an end in itself is the driving force in economic research.   
 
For purposes of model building, assumptions can be made with impunity; but when it comes 
to policy formulation involving jobs and bankruptcy costs, empirical relevance for monetary 
policy--a proper understanding of the structure of the economy--is essential.  Accordingly, a 
discussion of the impact of the ‘pure’ science approach as embodied in instrumentalism on 




David Hilbert maintained that mathematics is a meaningless game, which is played 
with  meaningless  marks  on  paper  [Bell  1951,38].    Hilbert  introduced  formalism  as  a 
methodology  in  which  assumptions,  axioms,  and  postulates  are  considered  as 
interchangeable.  Ever since, most modern mathematicians hold the view that mathematics is 
concerned with playing a game according to a given set of rules.  Given this view, it is 
imperative  that  non-mathematicians  enquire  into  the  'truth  of  mathematical  propositions' 
[Bell 1951,23].  While the relational terrain of mathematics is well defined for the purposes 
of mathematical investigations, in scientific investigations the deployment of mathematics as 
an effective tool relies on an intellectual effort which is external to mathematics for critical 
specification [Schwartz 1962,356-357]. 
Friedman  [1953,14]  maintained  that:  "...  the  relation  between  the  significance of a 
theory and the 'realism' of its assumptions is almost the opposite.  ...  Truly important and 
significant  hypotheses  will  be  found  to  have  'assumptions'  that  are  wildly  inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the 
more  unrealistic  the  assumptions  ...  ."      Popper  [1959,59  Footnote*1]  maintained  that 
‘instrumentalism’  “is  the  view  that  a  theory  is  nothing  but  a  tool  or  an  instrument  for 
prediction.”  Further on Popper [1959,423] stated that he labeled the view “that abstract 
theories are not genuine assertions about the world,  . . . they are nothing but instruments--
instruments for the prediction of observable phenomena.”   Friedman's Positivism [1953] can 
reasonably be identified as a version of ‘instrumentalism’ as defined by Popper [1959].   
Boland [1979] has defended Friedman on the grounds that Friedman is adhering to an 
instrumentalist epistemology; that is, prediction, and not explanation, is all that is needed for 
policy prescription.  The impropriety of such a position has been recognized in early debates.  
For instance, the mathematical astronomy of Ptolemy had been set aside as of no relevance,  
 
although its predictive ability had proven to be far more successful than the astronomy of 
Aristotle.  Since the physical astronomy of Aristotle provided a better explanation of the 
working of the cosmos than Ptolemy’s, it was considered superior to Ptolemy's astronomy 
[McMullin 1967,13]. 
Falsity  of  axioms  appears  in  the  scientific  literature  in  context  of  the  fact  that  the 
axioms  for  entirely  different  systems  (e.g.,  Euclidean  versus  non-Euclidean  systems)  are 
invariably false for each other [Pledge 1966,189; Flew 1989,426-427].  Friedman cannot be 
denied the right to take an opposite view to the perceived reality, but when the evidence 
based upon his own model design fails to support his theory it is difficult for policy makers 
to justify the continued adherence to that position--monetarism.   
 
ORIGINS OF THE PURE SCIENCE APPROACH TO ECONOMICS 
 
Adam  Smith  used  the  universal  law  of  gravity  (the  "law  of  the  invisible  chain" 
[Evensky 1989,124,142] developed by Isaac Newton in physics to arrive at the "law of the 
invisible hand."  Smith’s [1967,65] fascination with Newton's scientific achievement enabled 
him to be convinced of Bernard de Mandeville’s [1732] natural law principle of individual 
selfishness.   Mandeville, a fervent advocate of laissez faire, (in various editions, 1714 to 
1732) had explained in great detail the role of unimpeded self-interest in generating the 
greatest  benefit  to  society.    Recognizing  the  similarity  of  Newton's  mechanics  to 
Mandeville's  view  on  human  actions  (each  person,  unimpeded  by  any  social  constraint, 
following his or her natural impulse--own selfish interest--would produce results that appear 
to  be  guided  by  some  force  [Mandeville/Kaye  (1732)  1924,cxl]),  Smith  drew  a  parallel 
between political economy and natural science.   
Walras [1926,69-70] followed through with Smith’s ambitious idea and attempted to 
ascribe to economics the features of the natural sciences (physics in particular) and made the 
exaggerated  claims  that  value  in  exchange  (nominal  money  price)  is:  (1)  a  "natural 
phenomenon"--natural in its origin, manifestations and essence, (2) comparable to the law of 
gravity, and (3) a branch of mathematics (which has been neglected and left undeveloped by 
mathematicians).  It must be noted that the comparison of economics with a natural science 
is invalid. While human beings cannot alter the planetary motions, they can certainly change 
their  economic  behavior.    The  significance  of  this  latter  point  is  that  the  planets  are  
 
programmed to behave in a predetermined manner, whereas human beings are not internally 
programmed to act in a predetermined manner.  In essence, the objects of physics have no 
emotions; therefore, they cannot and do not react to emotional stimuli.   
The purpose of experimentation is to enable society to cope with reality; therefore, 
reality must not be denied.  Experimentation is always needed; on such grounds, one can 
justify Walras' strenuous emphasis that a pure science of economics needed to be developed: 
 
Following . . . [the same procedure of the mathematical sciences] . . . the pure 
theory  of  economics  ought  to  take  over  from  experience  certain  type 
concepts, like those of exchange, supply, demand, market, capital, income, 
productive services and products.  From these real-type concepts the pure 
science of economics should then abstract and define ideal-type concepts in 
terms of which it carries on its reasoning.   The return to reality should not 
take  place  until  the  science  is  completed  and  then  only  with  a  view  to 
practical applications.  Thus in an ideal market we have ideal prices which 
stand in an exact relation to an ideal demand and supply [Walras 1926,71]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
However,  when  the  results  from  certain  experiments  are  continually  refuted,  they 
should not be subject to the sunk cost fallacy and be continued.  Instead new searches or 
experiments on the problem(s) should be undertaken.    
It is important to note that Walras was following in the path of the natural sciences, 
astronomy in particular.  It is noted that Kepler and Galileo did use abstraction, but merely as 
a means of analysis; after the analysis they developed their theories not in terms of their 
abstractions  but  in  context  of  the  real  world--reality.    Johann  Kepler  recognized  that 
mathematical elegance had to bow to reality.  It was only by reverting to the reality of the 
observations of Tycho Brahe was Kepler able to arrive at the empirical laws of planetary 
orbit [Pledge 1966,38-39; Drake 1973,20].  Similarly, Galileo recognized that in reality friction 
affected falling objects.  In order to understand how objects fall, abstraction (the removal of 
friction) by Galileo was necessary to get a better understanding of reality.  The abstraction 
enabled reconciliation between Galileo's theory and fact.  However, both astronomers did not 
substitute abstraction (a world in which friction does not exist) for reality (a world in which 
friction exists).  In economics, unlike in astronomy, after the elegant mathematical economic 
model was developed by Walras, it was accepted and continues to be accepted as reality by 
many economists in spite of Walras’ own concern for the “return to reality.”  
 
THE QUANTITY THEORY OF MONEY: A ‘PURE SCIENCE’ MODEL 
 
In  great  part,  owing  to  rigidities  in  the  economic  system  the  price  of  a  particular 
commodity is an exogenous variable and not an endogenous variable; however, in those 
instances, where the price is endogenous, the dynamic adjustment is reflected in output: 
physical quantities are adjusted [Kawasaki et al 1982,998-1000].  The monetarists position, 
that  only changes in M (money supply) produce changes in the price level, is grounded 
tautologically in the quantity theory which holds that "the nominal money supply at time t is 
the nominal value of all assets" [Sargent 1982,1219].   It is held postulated that "the value of 
money and the price level are synonymous, or more correctly, correlative ideas” [Wicksell 
1935,129].  Therefore by definition, any change in the price level would constitute a change 
in the value of money.  Consistent with this reasoning, Friedman [1980,254-255] maintained 
that inflation (wherever its presence happens to be observed) is a monetary phenomenon.  
This view of money, as the value counterpart of assets, permits the calculation of constant 
real  balances;  it  establishes  "perfect  proportionality  between  money  and  the  price  level" 
[Sargent 1982,1219].  The monetarists argue for causation from M (nominal money) →Y 
(nominal income).  Yet, "[h]istorically, M has lagged behind Y at turning points [in the 
business cycle].  Crude cause and effect would then lead to the inference that Y is the cause 
and M effect.  But those who want to reverse the direction of causation can always take 
foolish comfort in the fact that the rate of growth of M, dM/dt, will for a quasi-sinusoidal 
fluctuation  turn  down  one-quarter  cycle  before  M  itself--and  thus  the  causal  sequence  
dM/dt→Y may help save the appearances" [Samuelson 1965,103]. 
            In  a  very  sanguine  assessment  of  Friedman's  work,  Clower  [1971/1984,118] 
maintained that: "Since the monetarist school has not provided an explicit formal account of 
the dynamics of monetary adjustment, . . . the bulk of monetarist literature . . . [is] so much 
sound  and  fury,  signifying  little  more  than  the  personal  charm,  dialectical  skill  and 
encyclopaedic  factual  knowledge  of  its  chief  apostle,  Milton  Friedman.    The  monetarist 
literature is important--and highly so--for the questions it forces us to ask about observed 
patterns of behaviour; but it is worth almost nothing as far as the answers to these questions, 
or guidance in seeking answers, is concerned." 
Evidence for twenty countries for a period of about eight years contradicted Friedman's  
 
hypothesis [Fellner et al. 1964,13].  Meltzer [1977, 201-202] concluded that: "if maintained 
inflation is defined as the average rate of price change, the results deny that inflation has 
been entirely a response to growth in money."  In addition, Laidler [1989,1157] stated: 
 
The data on the timing of cyclical turning points in various U.S. time series, 
which  Friedman  first  drew  to  our  attention  in  1958  (reprinted  1969),  are 
extremely suggestive, but the simple fact remains that a further 30 years of 
monetarists analysis has not been able to demonstrate the empirical existence 
of a structurally stable transmission mechanism between money and inflation 
to the satisfaction of its own practitioners, let alone its critics.  ...  Monetarists 
in search of support for the case that money is more a causing than a caused 
variable often turn to the analysis of extreme experiences. 
 
While substantial empirical evidence challenge the relationship between the growth 
rate  of  the  money  supply  and  rate  of  change  of  the  price  level  [Smith  1985a,532-533, 
535,542-543;1985b,1193-1196], nevertheless policy prescription has continued to be based 
on the monetarist model.  During the 1960s through the 1980s, monetary policy of most 
western governments were shaped by the prescriptions of the monetarist school of thought.  
In almost all countries, the central banks invariably use interest rate-control to implement 
monetary policy.  There are two distinct roles for the central bank's discount rate in monetary 
policy:  (1)  the  alteration  of  the  interest  rate  and  the  supply  of  money  -  an  interest  rate 
targeting approach, and (2) the alteration of expectations in financial markets concerning the 
direction of monetary policy by means of announcements - a reserves targeting approach 
[Sellon 1982,85-89].   
Except  for  Switzerland,  the  focal  point  for  monetary  policy  is  the  money  market  
[Poole 1990,38].  Both the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of Japan use an interest-rate-
focused monetary policy, for example; however, while the U.S. uses M2 and M3 as working 
definitions of money (prior to 1987 it was only M1), Japan's definition is M2 plus CDs 
[Grivoyannis 1991,140].   However, it is statistical goodness of fit of economic data and not 
explanation of economic events that has prolonged the continued adherence to the monetarist 
school of thought.  For instance, to bolster the cause of the quantity theory, Lucas [1996,665] 
draws upon a study based on data from 1960-1990 by McCandless and Weber [1995,7, Table 
1], who report a simple correlation between inflation (defined as “changes in a measure of 
consumer prices”) and money growth of .96 if M1 is used and .92 if M0 (the monetary base)  
 
is  used.    Lucas  [1996,666],  maintains  that  the  quantity  theory  of  money  “applies,  with 
remarkable success, to co-movements in money and prices generated in complicated, real-
world circumstances.” 
With  the  further  major  contradictions  of  the  monetarist  model  in  the  late  1980s, 
Benjamin  Friedman  [1990,70-71]  stated  that  “[t]he  simple  correlation  between  money 
growth and inflation . . . calculated in the form often recommended by Milton Friedman, 
although statistically significant, is now significantly negative.  One can only wonder what, 
other  than  a  tautology,  is  left  of  the  notion  that  inflation  is  'always  and  everywhere  a 
monetary  phenomenon'."  Yet,  instrumentalism  which  had  been  the  basis  for  policy 
prescription was not shaken. The natural rate of unemployment, one feature of the monetarist 
school, continues to enjoy a foothold in monetary policy models.  This situation reflects the 
continuing of an ongoing trend.    
In The  History  of  Astronomy,  Smith  revealed  his overwhelming admiration for Sir 
Isaac  Newton  [Smith  1967,65].    His  fascination  with  Newton's  scientific  achievement 
enabled  him  to  overcome  all  consideration  for  empirical  reality  as  revealed  in  Hobbes' 
[1651] remarkable exposition on human nature.  Smith [1776, Book IV, Chap. II] was more 
convinced of the natural law principle of individual selfishness which was expounded by 
Mandeville [1732] with such eloquence in unequivocal terms: 
 
. . . [Should one] examine into the Nature of Man, . . . [one] may observe that 
what renders him a Sociable Animal, consists not in his desire of Company, 
Good-nature, Pity, Affability, and other Graces of a fair Outside; but that his 
vilest and most hateful Qualities are the most necessary Accomplishments to 
fit  him  for  the  largest  and,  according  to  the  World,  the  happiest  and  most 
flourishing Societies. [Mandeville (1732)1924,Preface,p.4] 
 
It is maintained that Smith in later life fully realized the failure of "the Invisible Hand" 
as a functional reality and he was merely advocating an "ideal" system and not explaining 
the empirical reality; yet many economists have adopted him as the patron saint of the free 
market paradigm and hold steadfastly to that belief [Evensky 1989,143].   
Nevertheless, the field of astronomy does provide an insight into how reality should 
take precedence over mathematical elegance.  While Copernicus relied upon mathematics 
and deduction, it was Tycho Brahe's vast amount of accurate observations which enabled  
 
Johann Kepler to formulate the empirical laws of planetary orbit--the planetary theory as is 
known today [Pledge 1966,38-39].  The accurate observations of Brahe were at variance with 
every philosophical, astronomical, and mathematical tradition of the past.  This fact forced 
Kepler to introduce ellipses into the heavens in place of Copernicus' circles [Drake 1973,20].  
Copernicus  was  concerned  with  mathematical  elegance.    It  must  be  understood  that 
"Kepler's Copernicanism was no less guided by the desire to discover the physics of the 
heavens than his sober demand for precise mathematical fit between actual observations and 
the theory he proclaimed concerning the architecture of the universe" [Drake 1973,23].  Just 
as the metaphysical implications of the new astronomy and new physics were at odds with 
the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic views [Finocchiaro 1989,26], so to is the empirical reality on 
price level changes at odds with Friedman’s and the monetarists’ views.  
 
THE SERVICE FUNCTION OF MONEY 
    
Historically, in all the major inflationary situations, the monetarist view obtains only 
when there is a loss of confidence which brings about a repudiation of paper money.  The 
loss of confidence, a "crisis of doubt" (Bresciani-Turroni 1937,172), leads to an increase in 
the velocity of circulation.  In 1923, the use of foreign currency prevented Germany from 
being  completely  transformed  into  a  barter  economy.    Recently,  the  "crisis  of  doubt" 
resulting in the dislocation of the domestic currency was experienced in Russia, where the 
U.S. dollar is the preferred means of saving [Vasiliev 1994,134]. 
Nominal money has a service function; however, conditions can materialize which may 
preclude it from fulfilling that function.  In that case, the system will find a nominal money 
substitute  (or  in  the  worst  scenario  some  other  means)  for  conducting  exchanges.    A 
government,  within  its  domain  (the  domestic  economy),  can  destroy  the  capacity  of  the 
money  which  it  mints  if  it  fails  to  demonstrate  its  credibility.    This  condition  was 
experienced  in  Germany  (1919-1923)  whereby  the  mark  was  replaced  with  foreign 
currencies: "[f]irst in foreign trade, then in internal wholesale trade, and later in retail trade" 
[Bresciani-Turroni 1937,173].  Russia (1991-1993) provides a more recent example of the 
flight  from  the  domestic  currency  (the  ruble)  into  foreign  exchange  [Sachs  and  Woo 
1994,127].  (The international exchange rates is not at issue here; thus, the exchange rate 
mechanism in international currency markets is not being discussed.)    
 
            In each case, the government is operating on its credit worthiness; if its credit is 
destroyed then there will be a deliberate desire to dispose of that government's money   units 
for any readily-available storable goods.  The evidence reveals that, in the second half of 
1919, a loss of confidence in--the abandonment of--the German mark had begun; by 1923, it 
was  repudiated  [Bresciani-Turroni  1937,172,174].    Similarly,  in  January  1991,  the 
declaration by the Soviet government that the 50- and 100-ruble notes were null and void led 
to the flight from the ruble into commodities.  The subsequent announcement by the Soviet 
government in June 1991, that consumer prices would be raised in 1992, resulted in a further 
loss of confidence precipitating a further flight from the ruble into commodities and foreign 
exchange [Sachs and Woo 1994,127].  In the absence of such a condition, while changing 
demand and supply conditions for goods and services will produce different general price 
levels, nominal money will not lose value over time. 
 
PURCHASING POWER AND NOMINAL MONEY: THE REALITY AND ITS EXPRESSION 
 
The change in the general price level (stated as change in the value of money) has been 
viewed by some economists as some sort of economic wave carried by purchasing power.  If 
the  purchasing  power  theory  implied  by  the  quantity  theory  of  money  is  correct,  then 
purchasing power represents an unchanging absolute value, to which the rate of change in the 
price level should be directly related.   The foregoing reasoning leads to a trap, since one 
cannot measure the value of price level change to disprove the purchasing power theory as 
follows. (1) Almost all methods of measuring price level changes involves units of money 
(price signals) in buying and selling transactions, so the price level change actually measured 
is an average change for prices in this dynamic process.  (2) Purchasing power resides in 
goods and services that satisfy human needs.   Purchasing power of a commodity is not a 
constant; it is a relative value based upon the intensity of desire (psychologically induced) 
and  institutional  forces  (e.g.,  union  strength  in  pay  increases  and  technological  changes) 
acting upon each and every commodity. 
According  to  Galbraith  [1997,106]:  “the  measure  of  scientific  maturity  lies  in  a 
willingness to match theory with evidence, to discuss anomalies with an open mind, and    to 
move on when it is appropriate to do so.  Occasionally, this may mean reconstructing one’s 
thinking from the ground up.”  As argued earlier, it is the net effect of the realignment (of the  
 
prices  of  commodities)  that  produces  the  change  in  the  price  level.    Depending  on  the 
weights assigned to the various commodities used in constructing the general price index, it 
may be found that the general price level has gone up, or down or even remained unchanged.  
This price level index, which is based upon a basket of goods and services, may be useful for 
comparing the change in what may be called a "barometric" pressure of the economy, but it 
certainly is not a measure of the loss in the value of money. 
The  purchasing  power  uncertainty  is  an  identifiable  attribute  of  nominal  money  (a 
specified and unequivocal nominal value) which permits transactors to accrue information 
over time, by processing signal information generated by nominal money prices.  According 
to  Blaug  [1992,141: "The constant-real-income formulation of demand curves is . . . an 
evasion of issues: the income effect of a price change is an integral part of the real-world 
consumer behavior as is the substitution effect and to leave it out is to adjust the world to fit 
our theories rather than the other way around."   
 
            SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Purchasing power resides in commodities and is the end result of the dynamic process 
of  the  interaction  of  psychological  and  technological  forces.    Along  with  the  social 
evolutionary process, existing economic systems have not evolved into systems of "general 
purchasing  power  exchange",  instead  they  have  evolved  into  systems  of  "monetary 
exchange"  in  which  paper  money  is  accumulated  as  a  means  of  storing  nominal  value.   
Changes in the general price level are causally conditioned by a number of factors, which are 
extraneous  to  money  as  an  agent  for  organizing  economic  activities  through  its  service 
functions--liquidity  (readiness  to  exchange)  and  signaling  (measurement  of  the  relative 
values of commodities and reflecting through price the relative scarcity and abundance of 
one commodity and the other).  Current mathematical modeling views purchasing power as a 
constant value and nominal money as a changing value.  The empirical reality is the reverse.  
The analysis in this research paper reveals that persistent changes in the general level 
of  prices  is  caused  by  the  realignment  of  the  exchange  ratios  among  the  various 
commodities.    Thus,  the  pure  science  approach  to  monetary  policy  as  a  means  to  fight 
inflation--to eliminate, or at least minimize, persistent changes in the general level of prices-
-fails because it lacks empirical realism.  It is based upon assumptions that are invalidated  
 
by empirical evidence, which reveal that the persistent changes in the general level of prices 








1 For the history of changes in the Federal Reserve discount rates (from 11/16/14 to 12/13/01), see 
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